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W hile the Supreme Court decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases' has been much discussed, most of the real analysis
of it took place before the revolutionary change occurred which
made the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment the
most significant portion of the Constitution in civil liberties
cases. The result of this fact is that most previous discussion
has been partial in nature, and has proceeded from the assump-
tion that the fourteenth amendment was not especially impor-
tant to libertarians. Thus, while Louis Boudin, for instance, re-
garded it as the most significant case of its era, his criticism of
it is colored highly by the inability to foresee that the amend-
ment could (and would) be used in a manner more congenial to
him and that this would be done without repudiating the de-
cision.2
For this reason it appears that there is value in taking a
fresh look at this case. There are other reasons, as well. The
Slaughter-House decision is, for example, one of the examples
par excellence of the way in which judges can reach desired con-
clusions through the use of judicial discretion and thus play
roles of great importance in the American political system.
Then, too, the case is fascinating because of the ambivalent feel-
ings it has always produced in commentators, scholars, lawyers,
and politicians. Liberals, for instance, tend to admire the de-
cision because it upholds the states' police powers; but they dis-
like the fact that it reinforced the existence of a monopoly. Con-
servatives do not object to the monopoly; but they distrust it be-
cause it was state-imposed and so implied the power of states to
regulate private business. They were thus happy to see that this
*Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts.
1. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
2. 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 101 (1932).
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aspect of the decision was gradually reversed, sub silentio, under
the prodding of Mr. Justice Field. Libertarians, while not ap-
proving of the dissenters' emphasis on the rights of property,
disapprove still more heartily the majority opinion, which at-
tempted (all too successfully for many years) to foreclose the
use of the fourteenth amendment as a means of protecting civil
rights and liberties. And, of course, the case is always of inter-
est in the aspect for which it is perhaps most famous, as one of
the steps in the development of substantive due process.
Such a case never dies; there is always interest and impor-
tance in its re-evaluation, and the final word about it is never
said.
THE SETTING
In 1873 the United States was, for the first time, beginning
consciously to assess the effects of a burgeoning modern indus-
try. States were experimenting with various kinds of protec-
tive legislation, while at the same time the Republican radicals
in Congress were pressing for greater national powers which,
while keyed primarily to the crisis of Reconstruction in the
South, could have been adapted for use in the economic field.
The Supreme Court was at the end of its "Civil War national-
ism" phase; new judges were beginning to reassert the powers
of the states, and at the same time (somewhat ambivalently, as
pointed out above) were concerned with the protection of busi-
ness from these same states. Chief Justice Chase was ill and
would not survive the term; Mr. Justice Hunt was a recent
Grant appointee who had not yet, perhaps, settled into his
work. Field and Miller were the strong men on the Court; and
while on opposite sides in the Slaughter-House Cases, they were
rather alike in many ways. In any case they set the dominant
tone of the opinions in the case.
The case itself grew out of Reconstruction conditions in more
ways than one. Most obvious is the fact that, legally, it involved
the Reconstruction amendments, particularly the fourteenth.
But it was also bound up in the peculiar political conditions ob-
taining in the radical-dominated Congress and in the southern
carpetbag governments. It is one of the ironies of history that
in order to oppose the carpetbaggers in Louisiana, southerners
were forced to favor a broad construction of the hated four-
teenth amendment, or, alternatively, to support the unpopular
government in order to oppose the amendment.
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Louisiana's legislature (for reasons which appear somewhat
misty, and perhaps, as Rodell claims,3 bribed) passed a law cre-
ating a slaughter-house corporation, assigning to it the one piece
of property on which the same law permitted slaughtering and
prohibiting anyone else from using any other premises for
slaughtering within New Orleans. While this law is character-
ized by the dissenters (and by most text writers) as one creat-
ing a legal monopoly, it should be noted that it did not literally
drive other slaughterers or butchers out of business. On the con-
trary, it contained a clause requiring the corporation to permit
other persons to slaughter animals on its premises, with a fine
for refusal, and also set a maximum charge for this service. Al-
though the records do not show this, it is perfectly possible that
an independent slaughterer could actually have done business
more cheaply under this arrangement than by maintaining his
own abattoir. The state defended the statute on the grounds
that it was an ordinary exercise of its police power; while the
independent butchers attacked it as a violation of their rights
under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The complexi-
ties of the situation in which various parties found themselves
in relation to this law and the court case have perhaps been best
described by Louis Boudin.
"What was more important to the South . . . To find a
means of preventing misgovernment by carpetbag legisla-
tures, by invoking the aid, and thereby augmenting the
power, of the Federal Judiciary? Or, to prevent, if possible,
the North from using the Fourteenth Amendment as the ef-
ficient instrument, which it was designed to be, of the North-
ern Reconstruction policy - by denying that the Fourteenth
Amendment had any real life or substance to it? On this
question the North and the Republican Party were no less
divided than the South and the Democratic Party, although
the division here was of a different kind. On the one hand,
there were those who were deeply interested in securing to the
Negroes the rights which were intended to be given to them
by the War Amendments and the various Civil Rights Laws
passed by Congress. Opposed to them were the "moderates,"
who thought that the "peace and harmony of the country"
would be better subserved by not stressing Negro rights too
much, and by restricting as much as possible the operation
3. RODELL, NINE MEN 159 (1955).
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of the War Amendments. This political situation was further
complicated by certain economic considerations, which tend-
ed to further muddle an already muddled situation. The
"moderates" of the North were usually conservatives who
were interested in various State franchises in the form of
monopolies. They were therefore opposed to Federal inter-
ference. But, on the other hand, they had an instinctive feel-
ing that in the Fourteenth Amendment there was a weapon
of great potency against radicalism of all sorts, which should
not be neglected."'4
THE OPINIONS
The Court's handling of this case, while it involves many
complexities, must be analyzed before we can proceed to a con-
clusion. In a closely divided vote, the Court decided that the
butchers of New Orleans had not been deprived of any federally
protected right. But Mr. Justice Miller, in his opinion for the
Court, went far beyond the needs of the case before him in an
obvious attempt to destroy, so far as possible, any affirmative
reading of the fourteenth amendment. This required some do-
ing, however, and made his opinion a long and casuistic argu-
ment, since he had to demolish (one by one) every clause in Sec-
tion One of the amendment.
Miller began by taking a hasty look at the purposes of the
amendment. Apparently conscious that it might not serve his
purpose, he refrained from looking at the legislative history or
the statements of the framers. In fact, all the opinions in the
case evidence a deliberate refusal to go into the legislative his-
tory-a few hortatory comments based on general knowledge
notwithstanding. As Swisher remarks:
"It is a significant commentary on the judicial processes of
the time that neither the justices who took opposing posi-
tions . . . nor counsel before the Court deemed it relevant to
discuss the intention of Congress as revealed by the contents
of the Congressional Globe. The several justices approached
the subject, not from the point of view of detailed informa-
tion concerning the framing and adoption of the amendment,
but from broad conceptions of the recent history of the rela-
4. 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 98-99 (1932).
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tions between the nation and the states and of the funda-
mental rights of man."5
In answer to this, of course, there remains Justice Felix
Frankfurter's tart reply to Black's historical arguments in
Adamson v. California: "What was submitted for ratification
was his [Rep. Bingham's] proposal, not his speech."6 Neverthe-
less, such a comment, however pithy, does not necessarily dis-
pose of the point. For it assumes that "the proposal" (i.e., the
text of the fourteenth amendment) is so clear in meaning that
resort to the legislative history is irrelevant. Yet Frankfurter
has many times revealed his profound awareness that the text is
not clear; not only this, but he has been perfectly willing to use
evidence of legislative intent in other cases.7 And it must still
seem remarkable that no Supreme Court Justice before Black
ever attempted to go into this question. Thus Miller's rather off-
hand remarks have served to foreclose investigation, as they did
for Mr. Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey, in which he
noted that criticism of the Slaughter-House decision "has never
entirely ceased," even on the Court, yet refused to investigate
the question himself despite a rather obvious reluctance to ap-
prove the Slaughter-House holding unequivocally."
In any case, Justice Miller emphasized only the obvious fact
that the Reconstruction amendments were written because of
the need of protecting the freed slaves. He rather clearly implied
that they should be used for no other purpose, although he was
wary of saying so explicitly:
"We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in
this protection .... But what we do say ... is, that in any
fair and just construction... , it is necessary to look to the
purpose."
Turning his attention to the citizenship clause ("All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
5. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 338 (2d ed. 1954).
Note also Royall's comment, written as long ago as 1879: "[N]ot any of the
judges appears to have thought it worthwhile to consult the proceedings of the
Congress which proposed this amendment." 4 So. L. REV. 563 (1879).
6. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947).
7. See, for instance, his opinion in Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517
(1942), in which he investigates the legislative debates leading to the passage of
Section 3(j) of the Wages and Hours Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.
§203(j) (1938).
8. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
9. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
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wherein they reside."), Miller used his preceding argument to
indicate that, since the clause's objective was "to establish the
citizenship of the negro," it would be improper to read it as pro-
ducing any change in the citizenship status of people in gen-
eral.' In other words, the clause gave to Negroes whatever
rights (and no others) citizens of the United States had pos-
sessed previous to the adoption of the amendment. Since the
Constitution had not recognized any citizenship of the United
States until the passage of the amendment, this was a difficult
argument to make; but Miller was able to take advantage of the
fact that, while the Constitution had not defined citizenship, it
had contained (in Article IV, Section 2) a privileges and im-
munities clause for "citizens in the several States." This clause
had been defined in Crandall v. Nevada," and what Miller did
was, in substance, to say that the rights of United States citi-
zens before 1867 were the rights defined in Crandall as those of
citizens in the several states. Thus he could conclude that citi-
zens of the United States were given no rights by the fourteenth
amendment; all of their rights remained in the same status as
previously: that is, most of them are under state, not national,
protection. The "citizens" protected by the new privileges or
immunities clause are citizens only in their capacity as "citizens
of the United States," not in their other role as state citizens.
This distinction between state and national citizenship has
the effect of making the privileges or immunities clause a mere
tautology, since the rights of "citizens in the several States"
could never have been constitutionally abridged by any state;
thus the labors of the framers of the fourteenth amendment
were nullified by a few strokes of Mr. Justice Miller's pen.
Miller's next task was to define what the privileges or im-
munities held by United States citizens are- which, of course,
merely amounted to enumerating what they had been considered
to be before 1867.12 Not very surprisingly, he finds that such
rights are few and far between; they certainly do not include
the right to engage in the trade of butchering, and they seem to
include little else of any great importance. As Justice Moody
was to put it later, they are the rights which flow from the na-
ture of the national government, not from the nature of Ameri-
can citizenship. 13
10. Id. at 73.
11. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 36 (1867).
12. Id. at 73-75.
13. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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It becomes obvious long before he finishes this analysis that
Miller is not really much worried about butchers or slaughter-
house monopolies: he is attempting no less than the preservation
of the ante-bellum federal system, and he is in no mood to allow
a mere amendment to the Constitution to change that system.
Miller bypasses the argument that a constitutional clause should
not be regarded as a tautology, for in this case giving it its most
likely meaning would make a more drastic change in the federal
system than Miller felt judges were entitled to assume the
framers wanted.
"[S] uch a construction... would constitute this court a per-
petual censor upon all legislation of the states, on the civil
rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such
as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they
existed at the time of this Amendment .... [T] hese conse-
quences are so serious, so far reaching and pervading, so
great a departure from the structure and spirit of our insti-
tutions [, that] . . . the effect is to fetter and degrade the
state governments .. . ; . . . it radically changes the whole
theory of the relations of the state and Federal governments
to each other and of both these governments to the people.' 4
The obvious difficulty with Miller's conclusion is that almost
all the available evidence indicates that the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to make some kind of fundamental change in
the federal system.15 Just what kind and extent of change was
envisaged is, to be sure, a matter of considerable doubt, but it
seems abundantly clear that substantial change was contem-
plated. The decision was, then, dictated by an ante-bellum con-
cept of federalism; the Court majority was determined that, be-
yond emancipation, the Civil War was to have as little effect as
possible on American politics; and it used its power to that end.
14. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873).
15. Even scholars who support Justice Miller admit this. The amendment
"was meant to establish a federal standard below which state action must not
fall," says Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). Miller's opinion rendered privileges and im-
munities "an idle provision," remarks McGovney, Privileges and Immunities
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IOWA L. REV. 219 (1918). Of. 2 BOUDIN,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 114 (1932); COLLINS, TIHE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND THE STATES 10 (1912) ; CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT
MEANS TODAY 187-88 (9th ed. 1947) ; 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1049-11.8 (1953) ; FLACK, THE
ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) ; JAMES, THE FRAMING OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 197 (1956); LIEN, CONCURRING OPINION: THE
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1957);
RODELL, NINE MEN 159 (1955) ; TEN BROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 223 (1951).
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Justice Miller made short work of disposing of the due
process argument- a fact which seems a little strange as one
looks back on the case, since we now know that attorney John A.
Campbell's idea of substantive due process was eventually to
gain dominance on the Court, under the pressures of the indus-
trial barons and the Court leadership of Mr. Justice Field. Yet
considering the rather obvious illogic of the whole concept (an
illogic which is familiar to any teacher who has watched gen-
erations of students trying to puzzle it out) it is not surprising
that the majority regarded due process as a minor aspect of the
Slaughter-Howe Cases. Nor did the equal protection clause seem
any more relevant to Mr. Justice Miller.
So the majority decided the case almost solely on the basis
of the privileges or immunities clause, which was the most ob-
viously applicable. And so congenial to the post-Reconstruction
mind were Miller's arguments that no later case was successful
in reviving the privileges or immunities clause.
Professor Fairman has written that the Miller opinion put
the privileges or immunities clause "to a rigorous scrutiny."
But it seems clear that this is not true: or at least, that if Mil-
ler's scrutiny was rigorous, it was also one-sided; and if it was
superficially convincing, it was also ad hominem. It carried con-
viction primarily to a generation tired of re-fighting the Civil
War and anxious to get down to the important business of mak-
ing money. Any instability threatened by the fundamental
shifts in power which the fourteenth amendment might have
brought about would have endangered the main goals of men
holding what later became known as the "Gospel of Wealth."
Of the three dissents, that of Justice Stephen J. Field has
commonly been regarded as the most significant. Field differed
from the majority at every point. To him, the citizenship clause
made state citizenship derivative and subordinate to national
citizenship: "a citizen of a state is now only a citizen of the
United States residing in that state."' 6 And this citizenship car-
ried with it "the fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities
which belong to him as a free man and a free citizen."'1 7 He con-
tended, convincingly, that if the majority was correct the four-
teenth amendment was a "vain and idle enactment, which accom-
plishes nothing and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the




people on its passage."' 8 On the contrary, the privileges or im-
munities clause was meant, he felt, to protect "the natural and
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens," such as those
enumerated by Mr. Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield V.
CoryeU: "protection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety."'1
But Field's opinion, at least to a modern liberal, paints with
too broad a brush (just as Miller's does, but for a different rea-
son). For, as will be pointed out below, Miller could have up-
held the Louisiana law with a much different construction of
privileges or immunities than the one he chose: i.e., he had alter-
natives, and one can therefore speculate why he chose as he did.
Field, on the other hand, had no alternative; he had to state his
argument broadly or not at all, for the right to engage in the
trade of butchering was the privilege (or immunity) which
needed protection in the case. The other dissenters were, of
course, in the same position. The result was that each side went
to an extreme, and the moderate position which could have de-
fended civil liberty without defending the butchers of New Or-
leans was never presented at all. It is when reading opinions
such as these that one realizes that concurring opinions do have
value, and one wishes that the custom of writing them had been
present in 1873, and that some silent member of the majority
had availed himself of the opportunity to present views different
from those of Miller.
Mr. Justice Joseph P. Bradley followed much the same lines
as Field, with perhaps somewhat greater emphasis on the nature
of the privileges or immunities. 20 The third dissent, that of
Justice Noah H. Swayne, is undoubtedly the most eloquent of
all, if not the most clearly reasoned. Swayne felt that the Re-
construction amendments "rise to the dignity of a new Magna
Carta ;,,21 the meaning of the fourteenth is really quite plain -
it includes the fundamental rights of life, liberty and property
(although there is perhaps less stress on property rights than
in the opinions of Field and Bradley). He admitted that a great
change in the federal system might ensue from the enforcement
of the amendment, but found in this fact no reason for narrow
construction:
18. Id. at 96.
19. 4 Wash. C.C. 371 (1825).
20. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 124 (1873).
21. Id. at 125.
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"[T] he novelty was known and the measure deliberately
adopted. The power is beneficent in its nature, and cannot
be abused .... The construction adopted [by the majority]
is... much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not antici-
pated, the intent of those by whom the instrument was
framed and of those by whom it was adopted. To the extent
of that limitation it turns, as it were, what was meant for
bread into a stone."2
2
There is in Swayne's opinion a pre-Civil War abolitionist flavor
which makes it stand out from the others. It somewhat re-
sembles the type of approach to human rights which has been
brought out by Jacobus ten Broek in his study of abolitionist
thought. 3
THE AFTERMATH
The changes in the American federal system which Justice
Miller sought to prevent have come about anyway; and the police
power of the states, which he sought to uphold, has been con-
tinously limited since at least the 1890's. Yet the Slaughter-
House Cases have left a legacy which is of great importance, as
the dispute between the majority and the dissenters in Adamson
v. California illustrates..2 4 For in Adamson Justice Black was
arguing, in substance, that Miller had been wrong (he was writ-
ing that non-existent 1873 concurring opinion) and that the
Slaughter-House precedent should be disregarded. Frankfurter,
on the contrary, stood squarely behind what had become the
"traditional" interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. For
it has always been assumed by later Court majorities that Mil-
ler's construction of the citizenship clause was correct. Conse-
quently, it is still true today that the rights of persons as state
citizens are in some respects different from their rights as na-
tional citizens. This is conspicuously true of the right to obtain
due process from police and courts; the rule of Palko v. Con-
necticut, elucidated by Justice Cardozo to justify the Court's re-
fusal to apply the double jeopardy rule to the states, is based on
this distinction,25* and it is this that Frankfurter was defending.
In this respect, then, Miller was successful in imposing his view
of the fourteenth amendment on the future.
22. Id. at 129.
23. TEN BROEiK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 223 (1951).
24. 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947).
25. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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He was also successful in permanently depriving the privi-
leges or immunities clause of life. Peculiarly enough, as Cross-
key points out, he may not have meant to do so, for his opinion
left a possible loophole for bringing in at least the first amend-
ment (or part of it) under the protection of the clause. In de-
fining the rights of United States citizens under the clause, he
provided a list of examples which included "the right to peace-
ably assemble and petition for redress of grievances."2 6 This
was buried in the list and its implications (if any) were not ex-
plored. Crosskey thinks it was put in so that later courts would
be able to jump either way in interpreting the clause, although
he admits it is likely that Miller himself wished the narrowest
possible construction.2 7 It seems more likely, however, that Mil-
ler's listing (which also mentions the right to travel to Wash-
ington and abroad, to obtain the writ of habeas corpus, and to
use navigable waters) was carefully constructed so as to include
only those types of rights which have been referred to above as
pertaining peculiarly to the very nature of the national govern-
ment. If this interpretation is correct, then none of the rest of
the first amendment or any other part of the Bill of Rights
would be included. And this is the way the clause has uniformly
been construed. As a matter of fact it has never even been ap-
plied in an actual case involving any of the rights which Miller
listed!
There has always been, it is true, an undercurrent of judicial
dissatisfaction with the emasculation of the privileges or im-
munities clause. Justice Frankfurter was almost certainly in-
accurate when he referred, in this connection, to the first Justice
Harlan as "an eccentric exception. '25 For the position was taken
at one time or another by a round dozen or so judges, and one
has no way of knowing how many more. The Slaughter-House
dissenters are the obvious examples: Field, Chase, Bradley, and
Swayne. Apparently Bradley was so satisfied by the develop-
ment of substantive due process that he never returned to the
defense of privileges or immunities. Field, however, stuck to his
guns for a time, as his dissents in at least two cases indicate. 29
Justice Brewer joined in Field's dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont,30
26. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
27. 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1128-29 (1953).
28. Concurring in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947).
29. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90 (1876).
30. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
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as did Harlan. It was Harlan, however, who developed a power-
ful constitutional argument on civil liberties grounds -thus
avoiding the emphasis on property which was Field's main ob-
jective. Harlan's thought on the subject apparently developed
gradually through several dissenting opinions spread over many
years. It probably was germinated in the Civil Rights Cases
(1883) ,'31 but perhaps more importantly in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia,82 decided later in the same year. It was then refined and
developed in O'Neil v. Vermont 3 (1892), Maxwell v. Dow
(1899) , 4 and reached maturity in Twining v. New Jersey
(1908) .5 His most famous statement probably appeared in the
Maxwell case, in which he charged the majority with believing
that "the protection of private property is of more consequence
than the protection of life and liberty of the citizen."
Harlan's arguments had some effect, for the majority opin-
ion in the Twining case (written by Mr. Justice William H.
Moody) bore clear signs of misgivings about the path of decision
in fourteenth amendment cases. Moody seemed to feel that
Miller had written his opinion too broadly; he also, in referring
to the "weighty arguments" (of Harlan?) that the amendment
was meant to protect liberty, seemed to be rather regretfully
abiding by precedent merely because it was precedent. He con-
cluded, rather lamely, that despite the weighty arguments, "the
question is no longer open in this court," and apparently the only
reason it was no longer open was the feeling -later expressed
also by Justice Holmes -that by 1908 it was "too late" to ob-
serve the original meaning of the amendment !36 How many
other judges have taken this position one cannot tell.
When one adds to this continuing uncertainty by quite a num-
ber of respected judges the fact that four additional Justices
adopted the same position in the Adamson case,37 it becomes
clear that Harlan's position is more intellectually respectable
than Justice Frankfurter would allow.
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
32. 110 U.S. 516 (1883).
33. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
34. 176 U.S. 581 (1899).
35. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
36. It seems to have been more true then than now that judges sometimes felt
bound to refrain from re-evaluating issues that had already been decided in prece-
dent cases. But since this practice has never been invariable it is difficult to say
how significant it is in connection with the Slaughter-House cases. On Holmes'
statement, see Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1929).




In this connection one of Miller's failures is involved. In
Slaughter-House he paid little attention to the due process
clause, perhaps correctly regarding it as a minor contention of
the lawyers in the case. But he refused, as he had in the in-
stance of the privileges or immunities clause, to countenance the
idea that due process could be used to protect private business
from state governmental regulation. In this he was destined to
fight a losing battle (at least in the short run), for within
twenty years the due process clause had been converted into the
major defense bastion against such regulation, and it is quite
possible that had the Slaughter-House Cases come up in 1900
they would have received much more hospitable treatment from
the Court. And although substantive due process is now unoffi-
cially dead as a limitation on state control of business, 38 it lives
on in the area of civil liberties. The result is that, at one time
or another, most of what the dissenters contended for in the
Slaughter-House Cases has been brought under the due process
umbrella.
In one respect, indeed, the due process clause allows even
broader protection than privileges or immunities would, since it
includes entities which are not citizens. It might have been dif-
ficult to protect either aliens or business corporations under the
privileges or immunities clause, which extends only to "citizens"
of the United States. But since the due process clause protects
all "persons" it can reasonably be extended to aliens and has also
(under cover of the convenient fiction that a corporation is a
person 9 ) been used to protect corporations. Whether a corpora-
tion could have been considered a United States citizen under
the fourteenth amendment is highly doubtful, if only because
corporations are neither born nor naturalized. 40
A word might also be added regarding the equal protection
clause. Although, as has been remarked, it figured in the
Slaughter-House Cases to only a minor extent, Justice Miller's
holding - that it could not apply to the New Orleans situation
- serves as an example of what he could, had he wished, have
done with the privileges or immunities clause. It had the effect
of leaving the clause free to lead, as it has led, a long, interest-
38. See WOOD, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1951).
39. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
40. Corporations have been held by the Supreme Court not to be protected by
the privileges or immunities clause. See Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S.
112 (1912) ; Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) ; Oriet Ins.
Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1869).
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ing, and increasingly fruitful life, as the only part of the four-
teenth amendment which has figured importantly in the protec-
tion of the one group which Miller conceded the amendment
was intended to shield.
In substance, then, one may say that the fourteenth amend-
mend has wrought those changes in our federal system for which
the Slaughter-House dissenters contended. It has actually been
used to limit the reach of the states' police powers, and it is
still so used today (albeit in a different area). Nevertheless,
there are two significant differences between what the dissent-
ers wanted and what has been achieved.
First, the fourteenth amendment has come to be applied only
(or primarily) by court action, whereas it was probably intend-
ed to be carried into effect primarily through acts of Congress.
Whether this was in the minds of the Slaughter-House dissent-
ers is unknown, but is perhaps unlikely. The issue, after all, was
faced by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases ten years later;
and the two dissenters who still remained on the Court both
stood with the majority -Bradley, indeed, wrote the Court's
opinion - which practically made Congress powerless under the
amendment. 41
Second, although the Court has in later times given the four-
teenth amendment much more meaning than Miller would have
wished, it has never gone all the way. By maintaining Miller's
basic distinction between state and national citizenship it has
given itself the power to choose which individual rights are
fundamental enough to claim legitimate cover of the amendment,
and which are not. This is the aspect of the Slaughter-House
legacy which the dissenters in the Adamson case tried unsuccess-
fully to reverse.
To a large extent Miller won the battle but lost the war; but
it is significant that the war was lost on a different battlefield
than that on which the Slaughter-House cases took place, and
that the lineup of the opposing forces was not always the same.
THE ALTERNATIVES
The question next to be considered is: Could Justice Miller
have arrived at the same decision in the case without spreading
his net so wide? If so, how? And why didn't he? There are
41. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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surely few cases which illustrate so well the role of judicial dis-
cretion in the use of judicial review, for Miller had numerous
alternatives.
If one were to assume (erroneously, as we have seen) that
Miller's chief objective was merely to allow the creation of the
butchers' monopoly in Louisiana- or in a larger sense to pre-
vent the attrition of state power to regulate private enterprise
-there were at least four lines which his opinion could have
taken.
In the first place, he could have proceeded on the assumption
that the fourteenth amendment was meant to apply only- or
mainly - to Negro rights, and could have little or no application
beyond such rights. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, Mil-
ler's opinion starts out as though this were what he intends.
Yet, as Boudin avers, he ends by interpreting the amendment
so narrowly that it actually protects no one, not even Negroes.42
The immediate reason for this is quite clear: all of the framers
of the amendment agreed that it was intended as a protection
for the rights of Negroes, certainly - but also that it was in-
tended to have general effect. Its words are not limited to Ne-
groes; as a matter of fact, race or color are not even mentioned
in the amendment. It would have been too much even for a
casuist of Miller's ability to say that the words "citizen" and
"person" applied only to Negro citizens or persons.
The question remains, however, of Miller's motive in intro-
ducing the race issue at all, since he could not base his decision
on it. There seems little doubt of the answer. Miller and the
Court majority were engaging in strategic obfuscation of the
issues. They were attempting to indicate that they had investi-
gated the legislative history of the amendment and were paying
some attention to the intentions of the framers. This is the ob-
vious purpose of Miller's remark that
"[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading
purpose found in [the Reconstruction Amendments] . . .
lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of
them would have been even suggested. '43
Having thus indicated that the majority has given due attention
42. 2 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 110 (1932).
43. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
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to the intent of the amendment, Miller can proceed to ignore it
in the rest of his opinion.
Secondly, the majority could undoubtedly have made out a
case that the Louisiana statute did not actually prevent the
butchers from plying their trade and was not, therefore, a
monopoly law at all. If such a conclusion had been reached, the
butchers would have had no case. As noted earlier, the law did
not prevent anyone from engaging in the business, and it is dif-
ficult at this point in history to know how gravely disadvantaged
they would have been by the operation of the law. It must be
assumed that they thought they would be driven out of business
or gravely injured, or they would not have gone to court. On
the other hand, it is certain that southern political leaders want-
ed a decision from the Supreme Court as to the meaning of the
amendment: on the whole, they probably wanted the decision
Miller gave them, even though this involved losing the case. It
is even possible that John A. Campbell, counsel for the butchers,
made his argument as sweepingly outrageous as possible in the
hope of getting just such a reaction from at least five Justices
as, in the event, was forthcoming. This is, of course, sheer spec-
ulation and is to be labelled possible (if that), not probable. In
any case, no succeeding commentator seems to have regarded the
law as anything but a straight monopoly statute, even though
on its face it does not seem to have been precisely that.
Thirdly, the majority could have rested its entire case on
the police power, and merely said that the Louisiana law was a
legitimate police statute; as such, the Court might have rea-
soned, it could hardly be considered to violate something as in-
herently vague as the privileges or immunities clause. This is,
after all, basically the argument used only a few years later in
Munn v. Illinois against a substantive attack not too dissimilar
from the one employed by the butchers.4 4 It would have been
easy to find that slaughtering is a "business affected with a
public interest," or, more broadly, that the fourteenth amend-
ment was not meant to encompass state regulation of business
enterprise. It would be necessary only to indicate that the
framers of the amendment had only the substantive protection
of the rights of liberty in mind: an argument which certainly
would be no more difficult for a judge of Miller's ability than
the one he did use.
44. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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Finally, the majority could have predicated its case on the
nature of "privileges or immunities." It could have pointed out
that this clause was intended to protect the fundamental rights of
all citizens (an interpretation which almost certainly is consist-
ent with the facts), but that the right to engage in a particular
occupation was not a fundamental right. Such a course would
have left the clause open for use in Bill of Rights cases without
involving the courts in the protection of business enterprise
against substantive state law. It would have left the clause in a
workable and meaningful condition rather than tacitly nullified.
It would, further, have met the dissenters on solid ground rather
than sliding past them. And it would have been capable of de-
velopment along much the same lines as the due process clause
has undergone since the Palko doctrine was announced in 1937:
a developing distinction between fundamental and non-funda-
mental rights which could be adapted to the conditions of time
and place as Cardozo attempted to do in his Palko opinion.
It is also true that there was nothing inevitable about Mil-
ler's interpretation of the citizenship clause. Here the dissent-
ers have at least an even argument with the majority. For while
there is little doubt that the major purpose- as Miller said -
was to make sure that the freedmen would have the rights of
citizenship, under Miller's construction of the clause there would
be little meaningful protection even for Negroes. At the same
time, the clause was not in terms restricted to Negroes, and
there is nothing in its wording to justify such a restriction. It
may be worth recalling, as a part of this picture, that Chief
Justice Taney had referred to the Bill of Rights as being privi-
leges or immunities of United States citizens even before the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment.45 So Miller had a reason
for trying to prove that the privileges of American citizenship
were not changed by the amendment.
Certain conclusions seem to follow inevitably from this sur-
vey of alternatives. Justice Miller was obviously concerned
about the possibility that the fourteenth amendment might be
used - as indeed the butchers' lawyers tried to use it - to ex-
tend federal judicial control over the entire reach of the states'
police powers, and more particularly to inhibit states in their
attempts to regulate their economies. In his effort to prevent
this he was, of course, to fail; but in 1873 he could not know
45. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-50 (1856).
1963]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
this. Yet it seems abundantly clear that the state statute could
have been upheld, and with it the states' right to control busi-
ness affairs, without nullifying the whole fourteenth amendment.
For this reason one must conclude that Miller and his majority
were in reality attempting judicial repeal of that amendment:
repeal by emasculation. There seems no reason to question the
opinion itself in this regard. The majority simply was not will-
ing to accept the amendment even at face value; it should only
mean equal protection for the Negro (if that). "State govern-
ment should be carried on with no further restriction than was
necessary to secure such protection.
'4
This is, then, one of those interesting cases in which the ma-
jority and the minority both seem to be wrong. The majority
erred (probably deliberately) in constricting the amendment's
meaning. The dissenters erred (also probably deliberately, at
least in Field's case) in expanding it; for all of the dissenters
argued that the amendment was meant to protect business people
in the conduct of their businesses. Thus they contended that
under its terms states could not legally create monopolies- at
least some monopolies. The attempt was to assimilate what
later became substantive due process to the privileges or im-
munities clause, or perhaps to the amendment as a whole. Field's
later career indicates that property rights were very dear to
him - dearer than other human rights, apparently - and he
was eventually successful, with the aid of lawyers at the bar, in
shaping the due process clause to this use.47 The first fumbling
attempt in this direction, made at a time when the full poten-
tialities of the various clauses of the fourteenth amendment
were not yet clear, occurred in the Slaughter-House Cases. But
as later cases showed, Field and his followers were not particu-
larly anxious to apply the same principle to the defense of Ne-
groes, of trial rights, or of first amendment freedoms; only
Harlan, in that period, tried to do so.
CONCLUSION
In a sense, the Slaughter-House Cases show the Supreme
Court at its most typical, for both sides seemed to be trying to
shape the Constitution to their personal prejudices. While, as
many writers have recognized, this is inevitable in some degree,
there was in Slaughter-House no apparent attempt - or at least
46. FAIRMAN, MR JUSTICE MILLER AND TIE SUPREME COURT 193 (1939).
47. See TwIss, LAWYERS AND TIE CONSTITUTION (1942).
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no successful attempt - to dissemble these prejudices, to ration-
alize them, or to raise them to a level of higher principle. The
motives, therefore, are plain enough to make the case an out-
standing example of the judicial process at work in constitution-
al issues. The moral is what the observer makes it: this is judi-
cial usurpation at its worst, as Louis Boudin would have said;
or it is a necessary and on the whole desirable component of
our system of constitutional (i.e., limited) government, as
Charles L. Black might say.48 Certainly one may disagree with
the decison in this case without condemning the courts or judi-
cial review as such.
Another instructive aspect of the case has to do with the
later history of the fourteenth amendment, which illustrates
that in the judicial world as in life, cats may be killed in many
ways. And the way in which judges have for almost ninety years
evaded the Slaughter-House majority opinion without ever over-
ruling the decision (indeed, usually while praising it) is certain-
ly one of the best extant illustrations of the alternative lines of
development available to men who know what they want, even
if they happen to be judges. The Slaughter-House decision re-
mains "good law" even though it has not been observed. Even
in its most effective aspect - the nullification of the privileges
or immunities clause - it could have been, and still could be,
evaded without reversal. But the due process clause has proven
so capacious as to make this unnecessary. A Supreme Court de-
Cision can, it seems, be important without being significant.
48. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
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